A common processing system for the concepts of artifacts and actions? Evidence from a case of a disproportionate conceptual impairment for living things.
We report the results of a single-case study carried out with a brain-damaged patient, G.C., whose conceptual knowledge of living things (animals and plants) was significantly more impaired than his knowledge of artifacts and his knowledge of actions, which were similarly impaired. We examined whether this pattern of conceptual impairment could be accounted for by the "sensory/functional" or the "manipulability" account for category-specific conceptual impairments advocated within the feature-based organization theory. To this end, we assessed, first, the patient's knowledge of sensory compared to functional and motor features and, second, his knowledge of nonmanipulable compared to manipulable items. The findings showed that the patient's disproportionate impairment for living things compared to both artifacts and actions was not associated with a disproportionate impairment of sensory compared to functional or motor knowledge or with a relative sparing of manipulable compared to nonmanipulable items. We then discuss how alternative theories of conceptual knowledge organization could account for G.C.'s pattern of category-specific deficit.